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Truth, Justice, and the American 
Dilemma 
ROBERT BATEY* 
In Harold Robbins’s quintessentially trashy 1961 novel The 
Carpetbaggers,1 a minor character, having sculpted a two-thirds life-
size female nude, reveals it to an admiring throng at an orgiastic Parisian 
party.2  But one partygoer, an influential art dealer, refuses to join in the 
admiration for this “perfect Woman,” whose features the sculptor 
selected from a host of models—most of whom are guests at the party.3  
The dealer’s reticence quickly undermines the confidence of the drunken 
sculptor.  Doubting first the perfection of the figure’s nose, and then 
more and more of its features, the sculptor finally smashes his creation 
repeatedly with a mallet, leaving only shards of marble.4  As the party 
guests gape, the sculptor then rummages through the fragments until he 
finds the piece he seeks, exclaiming, “Thank God! . . . Thank the good 
Lord that I did not destroy the sole thing of beauty in the stupidity of my 
disappointment! . . . The soul itself of a woman’s beauty.”5  On the spot 
he sells the shard—modeled on the pubis of Rina Marlowe,6 one of the 
novel’s central characters—for the outrageous price of twenty-five 
 * Professor, Stetson University College of Law.  For their helpful comments, 
thanks go to each of the participants in the Criminal Procedure Discussion Forum held at 
the University of Louisville School of Law on December 14, 2006. 
 1. HAROLD ROBBINS, THE CARPETBAGGERS (1961). 
 2. Id. at 264. 
 3. Id. at 266. 
 4. Id. at 265–66. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 260. 




hundred francs.  Ironically, the purchaser is the now-impressed art dealer, 
who also commissions a statue of Rina.7
In the spirit of that drunken sculptor, I would like to seize on one 
fragment from a Supreme Court decision, particularly a few sentences 
from the majority opinion in McCleskey v. Kemp, that seem to capture 
the twisted racial soul of American criminal justice.8  Of course, this 
focus is a modification of the assigned topic—McCleskey is certainly not 
an “underrated” case.  Rather, these sentences are among the most illuminating 
ever to appear in the United States Reports, and to fail to emphasize their 
significance is to seriously underrate them. 
McCleskey v. Kemp is without doubt a memorable case.  Professor 
David C. Baldus and his colleagues, Charles A. Pulaski and George 
Woodworth, had produced a detailed statistical study of the operation of 
the death penalty in Georgia9 showing, in the words of the Supreme Court, 
that “black defendants, such as McCleskey, who kill white victims have 
the greatest likelihood of receiving the death penalty.”10  McCleskey used 
this study to challenge his capital sentence under both the Equal Protection 
and Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clauses.11  Like any statistical proof, 
the Baldus study had been challenged on methodological grounds.12  The 
Supreme Court assumed its validity,13 but still rejected all of McCleskey’s 
constitutional claims.  In a five-to-four decision, Justice Powell first held 
that although the Baldus study may have established a racially discriminatory 
effect, it did not prove the racially discriminatory purpose necessary for 
an equal protection violation.14  Powell also rejected McCleskey’s allegation 
that the Baldus study showed Georgia’s imposition of the death penalty 
was arbitrary and capricious and thus unconstitutionally cruel and unusual.15
 7. Id. at 266. 
 8. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
 9. The study was ultimately published in DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL 
JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990). 
 10. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287.  Baldus subsequently conducted studies in New 
Jersey, Colorado, and Philadelphia that confirmed this conclusion.  See Samuel R. Gross, 
Race, Peremptories, and Capital Jury Deliberations, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 283, 288 (2001). 
 11. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286. 
 12. See McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 379–80 (N.D. Ga. 1984), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part sub nom. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877 (11th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 
481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
 13. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 291 n.7. 
 14. See id. at 291–99.  See generally Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. 
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (discussing when discriminatory effect can be used to 
infer discriminatory purpose).  The McCleskey holding seems quite ironic in light of 
rules like Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), which disallows asking former jurors 
questions that might disclose a discriminatory purpose. 
 15. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 299–313.  Georgia executed McCleskey in 1991.  
Death Penalty Information Center, Executions in the U.S. in 1991, www.deathpenalty 
info.org/article.php?scid=8&did=467 (last visited July 22, 2007). 
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Justice Powell added a final section to his majority opinion, indicating 
that “[t]wo additional concerns inform [the Court’s] decision in this 
case.”16  The latter factor—that “McCleskey’s arguments are best presented 
to the legislative bodies”17—seems decidedly odd when discussing the 
rights of insular minorities.18  It is Powell’s first concern, however, that 
is of particular note: 
McCleskey’s claim, taken to its logical conclusion, throws into serious question 
the principles that underlie our entire criminal justice system.  The Eighth 
Amendment is not limited in application to capital punishment, but applies to all 
penalties.  Thus, if we accepted McCleskey’s claim that racial bias has impermissibly 
tainted the capital sentencing decision, we could soon be faced with similar 
claims as to other types of penalty.19
Powell thus invokes the specter of the slippery slope,20 and the remainder of 
his discussion addressing his first concern slips down that slope as he 
mentions other races, gender bias, and even discrimination based on 
physical deformity or attractiveness.21
Powell must surely have thought this to be an effective argument, but 
the bottom of his slippery slope does not have nearly the impact of the 
sentence at its top: “McCleskey’s claim, taken to its logical conclusion, 
throws into serious question the principles that underlie our entire 
criminal justice system.”22  To this, Mumia Abu-Jamal, former journalist 
and current death row inmate, responded in the pages of The Yale Law 
Journal: “Precisely.”23  As Abu-Jamal noted, Powell had recognized that 
McCleskey was “question[ing] the fundamental fairness of the entire 
system.”24  In other words, in this single sentence Powell acknowledged 
the possibility—in fact, the probability—that American criminal justice 
is racist through and through.25
 16. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 314. 
 17. Id. at 319. 
 18. See generally J.M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 275 (1987) 
(discussing why protection of insular minorities is a judicial rather than legislative duty). 
 19. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 314–15 (citations omitted); see also id. at 315 n.38. 
 20. ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 213–16 
(2000). 
 21. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 315–18 & nn.39–44. 
 22. Id. at 314–15. 
 23. Mumia Abu-Jamal, Teetering on the Brink: Between Death and Life, 100 YALE 
L.J. 993, 1000 (1991). 
 24. Id.; see also Joan W. Howarth, Feminism, Lawyering, and Death Row, 2 S. 
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 401, 420–21 (1992). 
 25. See generally MICHAEL K. BROWN ET AL., WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF 
A COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY ch. 4 (2003); RICHARD DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES: 




Powell’s next two sentences only reinforced the point.  He stated, 
“The Eighth Amendment is not limited in application to capital punishment, 
but applies to all penalties.  Thus, if we accepted McCleskey’s claim that 
racial bias has impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing decision, we 
could soon be faced with similar claims as to other types of penalty.”26  
Of course, such assertions are routinely made with regard to sentences of 
imprisonment, most of which start with the appalling disparities in the 
rates of African American and Caucasian incarceration,27 and many of 
which end with specific policies having a racially discriminatory impact, 
such as the federal system’s one-hundred-to-one sentencing disparity for 
crack and powder cocaine offenses.28  And beyond sentencing, claims of 
racial bias arise in virtually every other facet of American criminal justice, 
from initial police contacts,29 through charging30 and jury selection,31 to 
incarceration.32
Rather than ignoring all of the evidence of racism in the administration of 
criminal justice in the United States, Justice Powell looks it full in the 
face for three sentences—but then he blinks.  He blots the evidence out 
because it proves to be more than he can bear.  To the four dissenters in 
the case, this failure is “the most disturbing aspect”33 of the majority 
CONVERSATIONS ABOUT AMERICA AND RACE ch. 8 (1995); ANDREW HACKER, TWO 
NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL chs. 11–12 (1995); MICHAEL 
TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT—RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1995).  For the 
claim that American criminal justice is also sexist, see generally CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER 
AND THE REASONABLE MAN (2003).  For analogous claims regarding “looksism,” see 
generally Sherry F. Colb, Confronting the Ugliness of Appearance-Based Discrimination: 
DePauw University and the Delta Zeta Sorority Purge (Mar. 21, 2007), http://writ.lp. 
findlaw.com/colb/20070321.html; Abigail C. Saguy & Kevin W. Riley, Weighing Both 
Sides: Morality, Mortality, and Framing Contests over Obesity, 30 J. HEALTH POL. 
POL’Y & L. 869 (2005). 
 26. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 315 (citation omitted). 
 27. See NORA V. DEMLEITNER ET AL., SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY 589 (2004).  
See generally TONRY, supra note 25. 
 28. See generally David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 1283 (1995). 
 29. See DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT 
WORK 99–100 (2002). 
 30. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (racially 
discriminatory pattern in “federalizing” drug charges does not justify discovery of 
prosecutor’s motives in making charging decisions).  See generally Drew S. Days III, 
Race and the Federal Criminal Justice System: A Look at the Issue of Selective 
Prosecution, 48 ME. L. REV. 180, 186–93 (1996) (examining how harsh sentences for 
crack cocaine offenses have a disparate impact on African-Americans). 
 31. See generally Antony Page, Batson’s Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping 
and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155 (2005) (discussing how unintentional 
racial bias affects jury selection). 
 32. See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 515 (2005) (finding strict 
scrutiny is the proper standard of review of racial segregation in initial cell assignments).  
In a remarkable move (even for them), Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented.  Id. at 524. 
 33. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 365 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
BATEY.DOC 11/9/2007  10:42:02 AM 
[VOL. 44:  517, 2007] Truth, Justice, and the American Dilemma 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 521 
 
opinion, a “complete abdication of [the Court’s] judicial role.”34  
Commentators have seen it that way as well.35
When I read these sentences in McCleskey v. Kemp, I always think of 
that moment in The Wizard of Oz36 when Toto pulls back the curtain to 
reveal the “Wizard,” who is frantically working the levers of the machine 
that makes him seem all-wise and all-knowing.  The Wizard is exposed 
as just another frail human being.37  In McCleskey, Powell represents 
both the Wizard and the dog who reveals him.  The Justice, attempting 
to persuade us with a rhetorical device, instead forces us to glimpse the 
racial realities of the criminal justice system.  He invites us to blink at 
those realities along with him, to let the curtain fall and pretend once 
again that he is the Wizard.  But he also makes it possible for us to 
continue to keep our eyes open. 
Perhaps Powell was unconsciously driven to reveal the weakness of 
his own argument.  The Justice’s biographer details Powell’s tribulations 
regarding the death penalty,38 ending with the astonishing revelation: 
 34. Id. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  To Brennan, Powell’s statement “seems to 
suggest a fear of too much justice.”  Id. 
 35. See, e.g., Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, 
and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1413–16 (1988); see also Derrick Bell, 
Xerces and the Affirmative Action Mystique, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1595, 1609 (1989); 
Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death and Denial: The Tolerance of Racial 
Discrimination in Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 433, 463 
(1995); Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitution, 
85 MICH. L. REV. 1741, 1795 (1987); David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional 
Fact-Finding”: Exploring the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 
139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 609 (1991); Daniel M. Filler, Silence and the Racial Dimension 
of Megan’s Law, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1535, 1577–78 (2004); Sheila Foster, Intent and 
Incoherence, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1065, 1159 (1998); Phyllis Goldfarb, Pedagogy of the 
Suppressed: A Class on Race and the Death Penalty (Boston College Law School Legal 
Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper 129, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=977779 (forthcoming in the New York University Review of 
Law and Social Change); Tracey L. Meares, Three Objections to the Use of Empiricism 
in Criminal Law and Procedure—And Three Answers, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 851, 862; 
Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Black Man’s Burden: Race and the Death Penalty in America, 
81 OR. L. REV. 15, 29–30 (2002); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 
41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1146 (1989). 
 36. THE WIZARD OF OZ (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939). 
 37. See The Internet Movie Script Database, http://www.imsdb.com/scripts/ 
Wizard-of-Oz,-The.html (last visited July 22, 2007). 
 38. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 434–54 (1994). 




[I]n the summer of 1991 [four years after his retirement], Powell was asked 
whether he would change his vote in any case: ‘Yes, McCleskey v. Kemp . . . .  I 
would vote the other way in any capital case . . . .  I have come to think that 
capital punishment should be abolished.’39
Even in this recantation, Powell continued to blink, limiting his criticism 
of the criminal justice system to the death penalty without even emphasizing 
the racial bias in the administration of that penalty.  Rather, according to 
his biographer, Powell stressed that “the haggling and delay and 
seemingly endless litigation in every capital case brought the law itself 
into disrepute.”40
Whatever were Powell’s blinders—I recall a waggish comment about 
him that there ought to be a special place in hell for judges who change 
their minds on major legal issues after they no longer can do anything 
about them—we do not have to wear those blinders.  We can recognize 
the pervasiveness of race in the American criminal justice system, and 
hold up a three-sentence shard (from an opinion otherwise worthy of 
being smashed) as the one moment when that reality broke through, one 
chink in the usually seamless hypocrisy with which the pages of the 
United States Reports assert the race-neutrality of criminal justice in the 
United States. 
Perhaps Powell, in his retirement, subconsciously rued what might 
have been.  Instead of blandly denying McCleskey’s claims,41 he might 
have used the insight of those three sentences as the heart of a stirring 
contrary opinion,42 one that could have been as significant to American 
 39. Id. at 451. 
 40. Id. at 452. 
 41. For a detailed rhetorical analysis of the entire opinion, see generally AMSTERDAM & 
BRUNER, supra note 20, at 194–216. 
 42. Such an opinion could have begun: 
Though scientists doubt its biological validity, the concept of race has 
profoundly scarred our history as Americans.  Differences in skin color 
allowed our forefathers to enslave millions of Africans and their descendants, 
treating them as chattels, as less than human.  After hundreds of thousands of 
Americans died in the struggle to end slavery in the United States, blacks 
gained constitutional personhood and the “equal protection of the laws,” but 
white Americans continued to deny them equality in countless ways, both legal 
and social.  Racism—allowing consciousness of skin color to affect one’s 
dealings with another human being—was and is an undeniable fact of American 
life.  Its taint is everywhere, including our criminal courtrooms.  Though the 
United States may never be able to eradicate that taint, we should at the very 
least prevent the legal taking of a human life when we find, as we do today, 
that race consciousness has significantly contributed to the decision to execute. 
This hypothetical decision could have been analogized to Powell’s opinions for the 
Court in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (rendering it easier to demonstrate 
prosecutorial discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges), and might also 
have drawn support from the unacknowledged suspicion of racial discrimination that 
motivated Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (disallowing the death penalty for the 
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criminal justice as Brown v. Board of Education43 was to American 
education.  If Powell had possessed the vision and persuasion of Earl 
Warren, he might have convinced a broad majority44 to acknowledge 
that Gunnar Myrdal’s American Dilemma extends into the nation’s 
criminal courts.45  Powell was, however, neither Earl Warren nor Superman 
in judicial robes,46 and the opportunity he wasted in McCleskey v. Kemp 
was a loss not just for an old man at the end of his life, but also for 
America. 
rape of an adult woman), in which Powell concurred.  See generally James R. Acker, 
Social Science in Supreme Court Death Penalty Cases: Citation Practices and Their 
Implications, 8 JUST. Q. 421, 431 (1991); Dennis D. Dorin, Two Different Worlds: 
Criminologists, Justices and Racial Discrimination in the Imposition of Capital 
Punishment in Rape Cases, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1667 (1981) (discussing the 
role of race in Coker). 
Though Powell had dissented in Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986) (holding that an 
African-American defendant in a capital case has the right to voir dire prospective jurors 
on racial bias), he could have used its precursors, Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 
(1973) (finding racial voir dire necessary because of the case’s particular facts), and 
Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 597 n.9 (1976) (concluding that even when racial voir 
dire is not constitutionally required, allowing it is “the wiser course”)—the first of which 
he joined, the second of which he authored, and both of which he cited with approval in 
his Turner dissent, 476 U.S. at 46 (Powell, J., dissenting)—to undergird a decision in 
McCleskey’s favor. 
 43. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 44. In addition to Powell and the four dissenters in McCleskey, a Justice as 
politically skillful as Warren could probably have persuaded Justices White and 
O’Connor to agree with him.  See generally G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN, A 
PUBLIC LIFE (1982).  Whether such a Justice could have then obtained reluctant acquiescence 
from Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia is more questionable, but perhaps no 
more of a stretch than Warren’s achievement of unanimity in Brown, 347 U.S. 483.  See 
Dennis D. Dorin, Far Right of the Mainstream: Racism, Rights, and Remedies from the 
Perspective of Justice Antonin Scalia’s McCleskey Memorandum, 45 MERCER L. REV. 
1035 (1994) (analyzing Justice Scalia’s role in the McCleskey decision). 
 45. GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND 
MODERN DEMOCRACY (1944).  This work was instrumental in bringing awareness to 
pervasive racial prejudice in America.  See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 n.11 (1954) (citing 
MYRDAL, supra).   
Justice Brennan’s McCleskey dissent comes close to sounding this theme in the clarion 
fashion it deserves, but it is only a dissent.  Further, it is written, as dissents so frequently 
are, to suggest that following a view contrary to the majority’s will work no great change 
in prevailing law.  See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 342 (1987) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (“The Court's projection of apocalyptic consequences for criminal sentencing is 
thus greatly exaggerated.”). 
 46. “For those who served with him, Earl Warren will always be the Super Chief.”  
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT—A 
JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY vii (1983) (quoting William J. Brennan, Jr.). 




On the day McCleskey was decided, there was a performance of The 
Fantasticks in New York City.47  In the musical’s second act, a man and 
a woman confront shocking realities—a human set afire, another beaten, 
a third impaled on a bed of nails—but repeatedly cry out for “The mask!  
The mask!”48  This “plastic mask of a laughing-hollow face that is frozen 
forever into unutterable joy . . . blocks out any little tell-tale traces of 
compassion or of horror.”49  Thus, the mask prettifies what the couple 
sees and allows them to dance away, singing as they go.50  Similarly, 
McCleskey v. Kemp shows us just a flash of the reality of American criminal 
justice but then raises, once again, the mask of legalisms that allows us 
to go on, blithely ignoring the system’s pervasive racism. 
Minorities play either stereotypical or nonexistent roles in the artifacts 
of twentieth-century popular culture invoked in this essay: The 
Carpetbaggers features a black manservant named “Robair” and a raped 
squaw.51  The only nonwhites I can recall in The Wizard of Oz or the 
pages of Superman are animals, munchkins, or extraterrestrials;52 one 
character in The Fantasticks, an actor, plays a stock company Indian, 
complete with headdress.53  The Supreme Court’s twentieth century criminal 
jurisprudence similarly relegates African Americans and other racial groups 
to subservience.  Is there any reason to imagine that this will change in 
the twenty-first century? 
 
 47. The play ran from May 3, 1960, to January 13, 2002.  The Fantasticks Official 
Website, http://www.thefantasticks.com/webpages/home.html (last visited July 22, 2007). 
 48. TOM JONES & HARVEY SCHMIDT, THE FANTASTICKS 97–104 (30th anniversary 
ed. 1990). 
 49. Id. at 98. 
 50. Id. at 98–104. 
 51. See ROBBINS, supra note 1, at 26, 80–81. 
 52. It should be no surprise, however, to find at least one academic opining that the 
Oz books “anticipate[] current multicultural theories” and embrace “cultural pluralism.”  
Andrew Karp, Utopian Tension in L. Frank Baum’s Oz, 9 UTOPIAN STUD. 103, 118 
(1998), available at http://www.halcyon.com/piglet/books8-Karp.htm (last visited Aug. 
2, 2007).  No doubt there is a similar claim regarding Superman. 
 53. See JONES & SCHMIDT, supra note 48, at 59. 
